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Abstract
Many incumbents have the ambition to become
ecosystem leaders when transitioning to platform
business models. While most prior research has studied
established consumer markets, our study extends the
empirical knowledge on ecosystem dynamics with a
focus on platform around industrial data. In a
longitudinal study, we investigate factors influencing
this transition and study in particular how industrial
incumbents balance value creation and capture during
ecosystem emergence. In this stage, managing openness
is a key strategic decision. While openness is required
for value creation, the complexity and physicality of the
industrial setting hampers value capture. We identify
control points to manage the tension between value
creation & capture and derive different transition
journeys. Lastly, we propose that in industrial markets,
multiple platforms can co-exist in the same ecosystem,
complementing the established "winner-takes-all"
paradigm. Our research identifies situations where
incumbents intentionally forfeit a leadership position in
favor of joining an alliance-driven ecosystem.
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1. Introduction
Platforms connect multiple sides to enable transactions
or foster innovation [1, 27]. Platforms can be considered
the technological architecture [46]. Based on this
architecture, firms develop platform-based business
models (BM)1. For that, they need to coordinate the
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network of producers and consumers [47]. Together,
they build an ecosystem consisting of a central platform
with multiple peripheral firms connected to it [27].
Following the dominant view in the literature, platformbased BMs are orchestrated by a central (keystone)
player profiting from abnormal returns due to network
effects [1, 26]. The value of the platform increases for
users with the number of other users (direct network
effects) [9, 32], or with a greater variety of
complementary products or services (indirect network
effects) [39, 42]. As a result, winner-take-all (WTA)
situations arise, when the market tips towards a
dominant platform [17, 43]. In WTA markets, the
orchestrator of the dominant platform captures the
biggest share of value [52]. Consequently, firms
changing towards a platform-based BMs usually have
the ambition to become the keystone player.
The motivation of our paper is to shed light into the
emergence of new platform-based BMs in industrial
(BtoB) settings. Prior studies conceptualize the role of a
platform leader (also referred to as sponsor, keystone
player, or hub; e.g., [11, 26]), who governs ecosystem
alignment and usually captures most value. However, at
this stage, neither the roles of the diverse actors nor the
leadership position are clear [12]. Instead, the overall
value proposition needs to be jointly created by the
participants of the young ecosystem. This requires close
coordination and alignment between the actors [12] – a
sharp contrast to the later stage of a mature ecosystem,
when one actor often leads the ecosystem by its
dominating
platform.
Hence,
analyzing
the
interdependencies and relationships between the actors
provides insights into the value creation process [5, 30].
These relationships are characterized by either
cooperation or competition [23]. Thus, the starting stage
of a new ecosystem creates a sensitive moment of

1

A business model (BM) describes the logic of how an organization
creates, offers, and captures value regarding their customers,
suppliers, and partners [8].
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critically shaping intentions and behavior of a diverse
set of actors.
During this stage, incumbents in the industry try to
transition from a traditional BM, often referred to as a
pipe(line) BM by creating value through controlled
activities along a classic value chain, to a platformbased BM [47]. For this, multiple potential ecosystem
designs exist which affect competition and opportunities
to capture value. Earlier literature suggests that
(different degrees of) openness is the critical design
element creating momentum at this stage [11, 48].
Following Eisenmann et al. [16], openness can be
defined as the (lack of) “restrictions […] placed on
participation in development, commercialization, and
use”. More broadly, openness refers to reducing or
eliminating access restrictions, for instance from
proprietary control over interfaces between the platform
modules. Openness can spur platform adoption by users
and complementors by fostering network effects [16],
enabling new value propositions [27]. Openness in
general supports value creation (and, hence, is
increasing platform value) by actively allowing the
integration of innovations from third-party complementors [6, 19]. Connecting with complementors by
providing access to a firm's own resources drives the
dynamics of ecosystem evolvement. The underlying
open interfaces further fuel the competitive dynamic in
the ecosystem, as they are also potential entry points for
competitors [4]. Ecosystem dynamics might even lead
to a convergence of markets with blurred industry
boundaries [9]. In such a situation, a previously
dominating actor may lose its ability to capture value.
Taken together, establishing a platform in an evolving
ecosystem leads to a tension between value creation and
capture [48].
The objective of this paper is to study these tensions
empirically. We use the context of industrial platformbased BMs for Industry 4.0,2 without doubt a main
competitive driver of our global economy [41]. Such an
industrial ecosystem consists of layers of connected
physical machines, communication networks, data
spaces, and digital services constituting around an
emergent new industrial platform [37, 40]. Here,
formerly isolated companies connect via standardized
interfaces and autonomous data exchange [41]. The
value propositions enabled by these Industry 4.0
platforms, such as predictive maintenance or performance-based pricing, rely on some degrees of openness,
as they require the integration of third-party contributors
and data sharing with and among them [38, 50]. These
new entrants, however, often redefine the competitive

boundaries of the ecosystem and change the logic of
value creation and capture, e.g., shift competition from
selling physical assets towards offering data-driven
services [3].
Prior studies in this context have focused on mature
platforms in digital consumer markets (e.g. [31]).
However, gaining a better understanding of these
dynamics is especially insightful in industrial markets
with high fixed-cost, where openness has a potentially
high impact [3]. Yet, when studying industrial platforms
and related ecosystems, the openness decision is less
simple. First, these ecosystems are characterized by
complex technological setups and legacy structures. The
layered architecture of hardware, networks, services,
and content increases the interfaces that can be opened
[50]. This may support value creation but increases
openness risks from (fuzzy) ecosystem interdependencies. In addition, ecosystem members operate in
legacy structures, i.e. they have existing relationships
and value chains which limits the decision space with
regards to openness [45]. At the same time, new entrants
change the existing industry architecture, potentially
shifting competition to other layers and preventing the
platform orchestrator from capturing value.
Second, both the development and distribution of
physical machines require high investment costs. This is
in stark contrast to digital platforms, like Android,
which have nearly zero marginal costs for distribution.
The limited global scalability of asset-heavy machines
makes local clustering of network structures more
likely. This in turn reduces the (global) strength of
network effects [52], increasing the challenge to capture
value from openness.
In this context, Dattée et al. [12] identified installing
control points as an approach to facilitate cooperative
ecosystem development while benefiting from it at the
same time. Control points, also referred to as
bottlenecks [4, 23], represent technical or strategic
solutions to issues constraining value creation.
Occupying a control point enables value capture and
mitigates risks resulting from openness. In ecosystems,
interfaces at module boundaries usually serve as
bottlenecks [2]. To manage the relevant bottlenecks,
firms can employ technical or strategic control points.
Technical control points comprise technical solutions
enabling or restricting access, but also legal measures
such as property rights [4]. Strategic control points refer
to institutional and sociological control. These
intangible control points include customer access, networking ability, or branding [46].

2

communication, network and autonomous acting capabilities. For a
recent review, see, for instance, [41].

Industry 4.0 is a commonly used label to describe the technological
revolution reshaping manufacturing industries enabled by cyberphysical systems, which integrate smart devices with sensing,
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We study an emerging platform ecosystem in the
agriculture industry, a sector where digitalization and
the emergence of platforms has rather progressed [40].
To deliver the full potential to the farmer, data inputs
from all stakeholders in the ecosystem are required.
Ecosystem actors are currently striving to position
themselves in that emerging ecosystem.
This illustrates our central research question: How
can (established) firms manage openness to design a
platform that enables them to position them
competitively in an emerging ecosystem? We analyze
subsequent ecosystem outcomes through the lens of the
interplay between value creation and capture. For our
analysis, we follow an incumbent manufacturer
transitioning towards a platform-based BM, with the
ambition to become the leader of the evolving
ecosystem by orchestrating its dominant Industry 4.0
platform. To investigate the dynamic processes of
opening
and
understanding
the
associated
interdependencies, we build on extensive qualitative
research [14] in the focal company, complemented by
research on other relevant actors in its ecosystem like
customers, suppliers, complementors, competitors,
dealers, or new entrants. In total, we analyzed more than
113,000 words resulting from more than 100 hours of
interviews and workshop observations. Additionally,
we draw on extensive secondary data.
Our study contributes to the emerging field of
platform-based BMs in industrial markets. First, we
highlight the role of openness as a means for ecosystem
alignment in emerging settings. However, we reveal
associated risks of losing value capture. Second, we
identify strategic and technical control points as a way
to mitigate those risks. Third, we conceptualize a
transition path of managing value creation and capture.
Fourth, we propose a new type of market equilibrium –
other than a pure WTA position – where incumbents
intentionally forfeit a leadership position in favor of
multiple co-existing platforms (“paradox of platform
play”). From our case analysis, we develop propositions
for theory development. Lastly, we extend the state of
empirical research with an in-depth study of an
industrial setting.

2. Research method
2.1. Case overview
We selected a leading European agricultural machinery
company (AgCo). AgCo is a traditional manufacturing
company of farming equipment (tractors, harvesters,
balers, tillage equipment, etc.). While machines are still
the main revenue driver for AgCo and the company is
positioned upstream with only indirect customer access,
it started a farm management platform in 2014, striving

to become an "operating system for farmers". On the
platform, all data from a farm (field, plant, but also
machinery and crop protection) is integrated with other
data streams (weather, crop prices, demand forecasts) to
provide dedicated digital services by AgCo, but
especially to spur innovation by integrating third-party
complementors and facilitating interactions between
farmers and complementors. In 2019, AgCo’s platform
was able to attract 40 third-party complementors, had
50,000 registered users of which 20% where paying
users. Given an installed base of 30,000 machines with
one customer typically owning more than one machine,
the number of platform users exceeded the customer
base of AgCo’s traditional business. In addition, AgCo’s
own digital services, a major source of user growth for
the platform, showed significant success. 8,500
machines out of the 30,000 were connected in 2019,
with 4,500 new service contracts signed in the last 12
months alone. More than 80% of equipment buyers
chose also the connected service offerings. Yet, the
ecosystem around AgCo's farm management platform
remained fragmented. The overall agricultural industry
is still in a transformation phase, there is neither clear
vision of all future roles of the ecosystem members, nor
are governance rules and ecosystem standards
established yet. In fact, most competitors of AgCo and
several other ecosystem actors (like crop protection
companies) offered similar platform offerings.

2.2. Data collection and analysis
We planned and executed our case study following the
suggestions for rigorous case study research by Yin [49]
and Gioia et al. [21]: a defined protocol for gathering
data, data collection, and data analysis, respectively.
Data collection took place in two phases: First, we
focused on AgCo and its direct stakeholders. We then
studied the larger ecosystem.
Our first phase of research focused on the
understanding of AgCo’s BM transition. We relied on
extensive primary and secondary data. We conducted
semi-structured interviews with 17 managers of AgCo,
representing all relevant departments and areas,
including the sales director, service director,
management board, and product management. In
addition, we interviewed 25 farmers, four contractors,
and three dealers to capture the direct ecosystem.
Interviews were semi-structured and adapted over the
course of data collection. The interview guide was
organized around the agricultural value chain with
special focus on interorganizational cooperation and
openness. AgCo also allowed us to participate in several
strategy workshops. Further, we got access to extensive
internal data and documents, including detailed
numbers of connected machines, digital service usage,
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customer satisfaction and acceptance, internal strategy
concepts, and annual reports. First discussions with
AgCo started in 2014 when it launched its platform. Our
data allowed us to follow a triangulation approach [18].
By combining primary with secondary data, we could
relate observations and interview insights to the
economic reality of the focal company based on the
documents, thereby validating the plausibility.
During the second phase, we expanded our focus of
the ecosystem. This dyadic design is especially suited
when exploring complex relations [10, 36]. It also helps
to mitigate bias by using multiple independent
informants [13]. We conducted interviews with
platform complementors, e.g. a manager from a leading
crop protection company, with ecosystem members not
yet part of the platform, including another digital
platform startup, or a wholesaler. We also participated
in a workshop with multiple digital startups in the
agricultural space. Further, we had access to internal
strategy documents and user surveys from a direct
competitor of AgCo.
Our data analysis combines deductive and inductive
approaches [21]. First, we observe AgCo’s transitioning
using axial coding [44] to link openness decisions with
associated ecosystem interdependencies. The
inductive approach was carried out using open and invivo coding. We focused on informants’ interpretations
on the factors influencing the ecosystem change,
company strategy, and associated interdependencies
[20]. Following the research guidelines, this part was
kept descriptive [24]. Second, we inductively identified
strategies used by ecosystem members to manage the

transition, value creation, and value capture. We
mapped AgCo’s key activities with the decisions to
install certain control points over time (refer to Figure
1). Data analysis was done in an iterative process. To
ensure validity and reliability, we triangulated our
analyses with secondary data sources. We discussed our
findings with selected informants to further detail our
interpretations. All interviews and workshop
observations were transcribed. We used both analogue
and digital coding via Atlas.ti. To validate our coding
further, we discussed differences in our outcomes and
modified the coding after each step accordingly in a
group of five researchers. We summarized our data
structure according to Gioia et al. [21] in Fig. 1.

3. Results
Our data allowed us to analyze how AgCo manages the
transition from pipeline to platform by strategically
opening selected resources to other actors in the
ecosystem. By following an openness strategy, AgCo is
able to create value, but has to manage the associated
risks of openness and ecosystem interdependencies.
Installing own control points, and also recognizing
control points of other ecosystem actor as being relevant
for the own business, enabled AgCo to create and
capture value. Inductively, we found that AgCo applied
two categories of control points and identified practices
for managing the anticipated value creation and capture
(Fig. 1). We found that different protection mechanisms
are required, depending on the layer of the closed

Figure 1. Data structure
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resource. In traditional markets where proprietary
resources determine competitive advantage, technical or
formal protection mechanisms are used [4]. In platform
ecosystems, the resource is most likely an interface,
either on the machine, data, or service layer. For
instance, the machine layer can be protected using
technical solutions to control access. While technical
control mechanisms are considered “strong”
mechanisms, customers are already trying to circumvent
this: “Thanks to these boxes, the software I use is brand
agnostic. I can attach a dongle to any machine, I give it
a name and the box knows which machine it’s connected
to. No need for any extra software.” [Farmer] In
contrast, the data and services layer are weakly
appropriable, i.e. it is much more difficult to protect
them using technical mechanisms. Therefore, strategic
control points are required, like creating customer lockin using network effects or establishing a powerful
brand reputation.
In the case of AgCo, we identified ten control points.
AgCo started with a pipeline BM selling machines and
offering traditional after-sales services via dealers. In a
way, AgCo’s machines could be considered a "hardware
app" for other platforms, for instance for pioneering
farmers who integrated their machinery into userdeveloped open source software systems to optimize
their farms. While AgCo strived to transition from
pipeline to platform, other competitors deliberately
chose to position themselves as quality leaders in
hardware. For instance, we could observe a premium
German tractor manufacturer following this strategy,
indicated as Appification (a) in Fig. 2 and 3. AgCo
recognized this control point of its central competitor
and enabled the other manufacturer to integrate its
hardware as an “app” to AgCo’s platform. Instead of
trying to protect the data and service layer, this strategy
enhanced both complementarity and mobility in other
parts of the value chain [28]. Thereby, especially
innovation in complements is fostered.
To transition towards a platform BM, AgCo
followed a modularization (b) approach. They placed
this control point by decoupling hardware from services.
AgCo started by offering its services for other
manufacturers via a platform. This kind of
modularization is the basis for ecosystem development
by building network effects [27, 38]. By opening its
services for other brands, the scale and scope of
industrial data stored and processed on the platform
increased. Machine learning algorithms as the
foundation of digital services, such as predictive
maintenance, benefit from these increasing amounts of
data. Opening hence provided the potential to foster
learning effects, similar to direct network effects [52].
The data basis made the platform more attractive for
third-party developers offering adjacent services. “By

joining AgCo’s platform, we can use more data to
support the farmer even better in its decision-making.”
[Digital manager, Crop protection company] Hence,
indirect network effects could be observed. As a result,
AgCo could attract 40 complementors and spur further
innovation in complements developed for the platform.
At the same time, AgCo subsidized (c) its services
for premium machines, thereby attracting customers and
creating a lock-in. This control point enabled AgCo to
finally convert more than 80% of the buyers of its
machines into users of its digital services. Previously,
this conversion rate was very low. The large number of
(subsidized) users (machine buyers) later attracted also
outside users (who did not have bought AgCo's
hardware) and enabled new data-driven BMs.
Subsidizing one resource to overcome chicken-and-egg
issues is a commonly used strategies in consumer
platform markets [7, 39], but was novel in the agro
ecosystem of our case study. Here, it led to a
functionally-specialized
platform
for
farm
documentation, co-existing among other platforms in
the same ecosystem. Such a coexistence of two
platforms in the same ecosystem (with no WTA
position) challenges existing beliefs in platform theory
[9, 39, 42].
In our analysis, we could identify several reasons
typical for industrial BtoB markets why no dominant
platform emerged at this point. First, specific regional
and functional requirements demand differentiated
platform offerings. As one dealer puts it: “What makes
sense in Eastern Germany can already be totally wrong
in Western Germany.” [Dealer] In different regions, the
size of the farms, composition of soils, profitability of
the produce, but also subsidies and regulations
regarding documentation and use of crop protection
differ. Platforms tailored to these specific needs are
required, hampering their scalability. Further,
agriculture deals with physical goods. The need to
transport heavy and perishable goods limits the
scalability of some services. “Most people forget we’re
not talking about a little bit of tomato-mozzarella. We
need to move tons of goods.” [VP, Platform startup]
Hence, while some digital services benefit from large
amounts of data, for instance predictive maintenance of
machines or crop protection recommendations based on
soil and weather data, services that are tied to the
logistics of the physical output or that require physical
access to machines have scaling restrictions –
supporting the evolvement of parallel platforms in the
same ecosystem.
Second, some stakeholders are convinced that
different parts of the agricultural business require
domain-specific knowledge, which cannot be provided
by central platforms. “There is a platform which is good
for documentation, one for resource allocation, and one
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for crop protection. It’s not a one-size-fits-all approach.”
[Contractor] In fact, AgCo’s platform focused on farm
documentation while, for instance, its biggest
competitor focused on machine optimization.
Third, the customers in industrial markets apparently
have a much larger fear of dependency from one
(machinery) company than consumers in a (digital)
consumer industry. In a survey, almost 80 percent of all
of AgCo's customers stated high dependency as the
barrier of using digital tools. Our interviews with
farmers reinforce this uncertainty: “I still want to be
independent from AgCo. It would have huge power due
to the data. […] Eventually, this would not provide more
more uncertainty for farmers.” [Farmer]
Consequently, the market moves from a pipeline
model to multiple co-existing platforms. Still, the
overall goal to establish one dominant platform was
very much known to the actors in the ecosystem. “It is a
data-driven business. For that, we need all machines on
a platform. Everyone is currently trying to be the first to
establish the dominant platform, no matter the cost.”
[Digital manager, Crop protection company]. A farm is
a complex system consisting of many different types of
hardware and other physical input factors, and farmers
expect a platform to reflect this system. “Farmers are
expecting me to provide them all the data. They want to
understand exactly their production quality, quantity,
what protein, nutritional elements I’m getting from the
forage. One day, there will be one end-to-end solution
spanning the entire value chain. For instance, one could
report crop protection activities to the authorities
automatically. Or a software connecting robotic milking
with feeding equipment. All then feeding into the
farmer’s accounting.” [Contractor]
Accordingly, AgCo wanted to expand its platform
offering to gain more market share. In this stage of
moving towards a more dominant position in the
ecosystem, we observed practices to establish further
control points. AgCo tried to influence users’
expectation on its platform’s growth by signaling (d) its
superior quality [51] in ads and on trade fairs. Thereby,
AgCo also increased its attractiveness for third-party
innovators. In addition, AgCo’s platform engaged in
platform envelopment (e), as described by Eisenmann et
al. [15], by leveraging its existing user base to expand
from farm management and machine services to
adjacent
fields,
such
as
crop
protection
recommendations. Subsequently, switching costs
increased for users. “Usually, farms stick to their
systems once adopted. A change is a risk, especially
given the amount of data. This starts with the stored field
boundaries and continues to AB lines and contour lines,
which are necessary for the assisted steering systems. If
we then need to re-measure 120 separate field cells, well
good luck. The switching costs are just too high. Also

considering acceptance by employees and the need for
software training. I would only change the system if a
new one provides significant advantages.” [Farmer]
Lastly, AgCo built on the fact that WTA outcomes
are especially salient if multi-homing costs (costs of
affiliating with multiple platforms) are high [22, 34].
Hence, imposing multi-homing costs (f) increases the
likelihood of tipping the market towards one platform.
AgCo’s platform applied a combination of freemium
models and subscription-based pricing. Customers
could select the services they wanted to use and pay a
monthly fee depending on the size of the farm. If thirdparty services were selected, AgCo received a 30%
revenue share, the complementor got 70%. As services
were not a free complementary offering anymore, it was
unlikely that users adopted multiple service platforms.
At the time of our analysis, AgCo could already convert
20% of its active users to pay for additional services,
counterbalancing its second control point of
subsidizing. As a result the amount and variety of data
collected on the platform increased, enabling stronger
learning effects and creating self-reinforcing feedback
loops of improved services.
Yet, AgCo’s platform did not tip the market and
remained one platform among several co-existing
platforms in the same ecosystem. In addition to creating
value, AgCo also needed control points to capture value,
to mitigate risks of losing access, and to protect its
proprietary resources. To ensure continued access to the
open resource, we observed building architectural
advantage (g) [28], in terms of managing the
ecosystem’s architecture to become its bottleneck [26].
This mainly relates to vertical or horizontal integration
strategies. For instance, AgCo enabled a crop protection
company to partially disintermediate its distribution
network, thereby reducing the value chain complexity
and establishing direct relationships. “One of our
strategies is to digitize sales, thereby skipping the
dealers.” [Digital manger, Crop protection company] At
the same time, AgCo gradually shifted from its approach
of offering services via dealers to partially offering
digital services directly to the user.
Horizontal strategies also include to establish
alliances to orchestrate the platform – a clear difference
to platforms in digital consumer markets where
predominately one keystone player is the orchestrator
[37]. Examples of such BtotB alliances include the
"Industrial Data Space" consortium or the "Open
Automotive Alliance". In the case of AgCo, the
company entered a "machine data sharing alliance" with
a few (competing) manufacturers. Another example in
the industry were wholesalers of crop products, who
usually cover certain regions while digital platforms
span across these regions. In consequence, some
wholesalers built an alliance to offer a nation-wide
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trading platform, while keeping their regional territories
for trading the physical goods. “Agricultural
wholesalers are regionally organized. However, some of
the larger wholesalers start building their own platforms
expanding their regional scope. Therefore, we joined
forces with smaller wholesalers from other regions to
build a platform.” [Innovation manager, Wholesaler]
Other horizontal strategies included acquisitions, e.g.
crop protection companies buying seed companies [35],
or massive investments in agro startups by incumbents
[33]. Jointly, architectural advantage strategies secure
data access which build the basis for further innovation.
To protect the proprietary resource, we further
observed practices creating lock-in effects (h). To
protect its machine interfaces, AgCo could block
competing service providers by technical access
restrictions. To protect the data and services layer,
AgCo helped complementors to build a trustworthy
brand by relying on AgCo’s brand reputation. “Trust is
a prerequisite – not only trust in the platform
orchestrator, but also in the complementors.” [Digital
startup] In addition, AgCo’s platform tried to create
lock-in based on learning effects, as described before.
“Due to machine learning, the service provider with the
largest amount of data will win.” [Digital startup]

Hence, lock-in increased both the data base and
attractiveness for third-party innovators.
In sum, we could map AgCo’s BM transition in
realizing its ambition to become a focal orchestrator in
its ecosystem by managing openness through installing
control points. Navigating these points can balance
ecosystem innovation (value creation) with value
capture and mitigate the risks associated with ecosystem
interdependencies.
Hence,
finding the
right
configuration of these control points evolved from our
analysis as the main lever to strategically position an
incumbent in an evolving industrial ecosystem. To
illustrate possible positions we derived from analyzing
AgCo’s journey and that of its ecosystem partners, we
suggest the framework presented in Fig. 2 and 3 (the
arrow in Fig 2 indicates AgCo’s journey). The
horizontal axis reflects the firm’s value creation
opportunity, i.e. its innovation path when transitioning
from a pipe to platform BM. The vertical axis indicates
the firm’s value capture ability. Strategic and technical
control points enable a firm to move within this space.
Depending on the selected control point and its
configuration, either value creation or capture is
triggered.

Figure 2. Control points in the industrial ecosystem framework

Figure 3. Positioning in the ecosystem
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4. Discussion
4.1. Theoretical and practical implications
Our research has been motivated by the question how
a company can find a competitive positioning in an
emerging ecosystem by managing value creation and
capture. In our analysis, we showed how the
placement of control points helped AgCo to cope with
ecosystem interdependencies and balance the
openness tension. Overall, we contribute to the
ecosystem literature with a differentiated view on the
competitive dynamics in the case of a complex,
layered industrial value constellation. Our findings
allow us to propose general transition paths for firms
when entering an evolving ecosystem (and innovating
their BM). Based on our case analysis, we identified
five potential positions with varying opportunities for
value capture, as depicted in Fig. 3: (I) Hardware or
Software App Provider; (II) Private Alliance; (III)
Keystone Platform; (IVa) Public Alliance; and (IVb)
Open Source Platform. Positions I, II, & III support
value capture, while IVa & IVb hamper it.
Transitions towards these positions require
movements along value creation (the ecosystem
innovation path in our framework) and value capture
(appropriability path). Along the ecosystem
innovation path, established WTA scenarios expect
actors to aspire a dominant platform position.
However, for industrial ecosystems, we argue that
market equilibria exist where multiple competing
platforms surrounded by "app" providers (for
hardware, software, or service complements) co-exist.
These platforms can be orchestrated by a keystone
player; however, we expect that often an alliance of
several firms will be the orchestrator [37]. Incumbents
in such an ecosystem will follow a differentiation
strategy [34], offering functionally or regionally
specialized solutions while integrating their offerings
on the alliance-driven platform. The platform
ecosystem then consists of different layers, similar to
the modular architecture of industry platforms [19].
Jointly, the layers build a coherent industrial
ecosystem covering the entire span of user needs.
Competition primarily takes place on the level of each
layer (e.g., among app providers) or between
competing platforms (alliances) in the ecosystem. In
addition, also multiple platform ecosystems can exist
in one industry. This is especially salient in markets
with high demand for differentiated features or local
offerings [22]. Hence, a few well-known brands in
each segment may dominate the segment, as opposed
to a large number of complementors in a global
ecosystem [9].

We call this the paradox of platform play, where
incumbents intentionally forfeit ecosystem leadership.
Due to technical complexity and the layered architecture,
competition shifts from the ecosystem level to
competition within layers. Alliances will try to establish
local WTA outcomes for certain complements. Here, fair
distribution of value between the alliance members is
required to ensure collective health [26]. For this,
integrative capabilities play a key role [25].
It is still open whether such an ecosystem
constellation is an alternative to the common WTA
assumption (and under which conditions), or whether it
remains an intermediate step towards a mature ecosystem
with one keystone player. When new entrants can
leverage an existing customer base in adjacent markets or
superior technological capabilities, they may seek to
establish a keystone platform. The likelihood of this
scenario increases if incumbents are unwilling to
cooperate (wanting the WTA position themselves) or
remain focused on their hardware business, hence staying
in their established BM [40]. The latter position can
become an interesting value proposition in an industrial
ecosystem, as hardware with open machine interfaces
allow their customers to connect to multiple platforms,
making their machines also more attractive for third-party
complementors (service providers). In turn, adoption of
their hardware is supported, as more services are
available. The manufacturer itself can use the increased
amount of machine data to optimize its future product
development [29], improving its position as quality
leader. In summary, we propose that the dominant
strategy for incumbents when transitioning towards
platform-based BMs is an alliance-driven approach.
As described, an alliance-driven market equilibrium is
prone to be attacked by new entrants, impacting the
movement along the appropriability path. As a retaliation
strategy, the focal company may completely open its
platform, thereby commoditizing this layer in the entire
ecosystem and destroying the ability to capture value for
any actor [3]. Open platforms emerge, either managed by
a public alliance or becoming entirely an open source
platform. We expect this to happen when a firm’s
openness strategy fails due to unwillingness of other
incumbents to cooperate [3]. Hence, no platform
ecosystem can be established. Also in cases when mistrust
and fear of dependency make customers reluctant to adopt
the incumbent’s platform, an open source platform can
emerge [11]. Finally, regulators can demand an open
platform when an initial platform orchestrator gained too
much power due to network effects. Becoming an app
provider then remains the only viable positioning for
value capture. Consequently, we propose that openness
will not only be used for coordination but also as a
retaliation strategy in emerging ecosystems.
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Given the rise of industrial platforms but the lack
of empirical research, our findings are important for
scholars and practitioners alike. We propose that
identifying and installing adequate control points
becomes an essential capability for firms to mitigate
the tension between innovation (value creation) and
subsequent value capture. Control points are even
more important in emerging settings where the roles
and rules for most actors are unclear [12]. We also
complement van Alstyne et al. [47] who state the
necessity to create platforms for long-term survival by
showing how firms can manage their openness risks
accordingly – and also can capture value from
selecting the position of an "app" (complementor) with
open interfaces. Our proposed propositions are
intended for theory development.

4.2. Limitations and future research
Our longitudinal case study in one industry provided
us rich, contextual data suitable to study a
contemporary phenomenon with hard-to-measure
constructs. However, this research method limits the
generalizability of our findings. We explored the
agricultural
industry,
which
shares
many
characteristics of typical platform ecosystems in an
industrial setting, such as asset heavy machinery and
high fixed costs, supporting the generalizability of our
propositions to other industrial contexts. Nevertheless,
this industry is characterized by large regional
differences, which could overemphasize some factors
(e.g. regional network effects) or create idiosyncratic
dynamics (e.g. subsidies in the EU).
In addition, while we incorporated data from all
ecosystem stakeholders, our research lens was a focal
machinery company. This may bias our perceived
uncertainties due to particularities of this firm (focus
on machines, being an incumbent). Future research
could benefit from the use of multiple case studies in
different industrial settings, cross-industry surveys,
and archival data to test and validate our findings.
Further, once such an ecosystem transition is
completed, interdependencies between different
phases of ecosystem development could be unveiled.
Future research could study how to reduce risks
arising from interdependencies between the phases.
As control points cannot be predicted a priori [23],
future research needs to define strategies how
companies can dynamically adapt their control points.
A simulation study could provide interesting insights.
Lastly, we could not cover the decision-making
process on the individual level of management,
understanding the perceptions, biases, and managerial
sensemaking in an organization. This is also an
important field for further research.
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